What Happens When Shareholders Disagree? Understanding Deadlock in Private Companies
- Osaris Chaichit
- Apr 4
- 5 min read
In closely held companies, disagreements are not a matter of if, but when. A deadlock occurs where the required shareholder or board approval threshold cannot be met in relation to a proposed matter, preventing the company from taking valid corporate action. Contrary to common perception, deadlock situations are not confined to equal shareholding structures. They may also arise where enhanced approval thresholds apply, such as unanimity requirements or reserved matters that fail to secure sufficient votes. In practice, particularly in private companies with a small number of shareholders, unresolved disagreements can quickly escalate from governance issues into operational paralysis, straining relationships and ultimately impacting the long-term viability of the business.
How Are Deadlocks Managed In Practice?
With respect to Section 1108 (1) of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code (CCC), the law suggests that companies should include dispute resolution mechanisms in their constitutional documents and shareholders’ agreement for good governance. While not mandatory, this reflects a policy shift toward encouraging companies to proactively address governance disputes. For this reason, well-advised parties typically address potential deadlocks through contractual structuring from the outset.
Common deadlock resolution processes include:
Chairman’s casting vote: It is a tie-breaking mechanism at board level, where a designated individual, usually the chairman, is granted an additional deciding vote.
Limitation: It can be perceived as unfair to minority shareholders.
Escalation clauses: Disputes are escalated from the board to shareholders, often followed by negotiation or mediation.
Limitation: The disputes may remain unresolved if the shareholders cannot reach agreement.
Buy-sell mechanism: It enables one party to exit or acquire the other’s shares.
Russian roulette clause: One party offers to buy the other at a specified price; the recipient must either sell or buy at that price, which incentivizes the offering party to propose a fair price, as it may ultimately be required to transact on either side of the offer.
Texas shoot-out: Both parties submit sealed bids. The highest bidder acquires the other’s shares.
Put and Call options: It provides a party with the right to require the purchase or sale of shares upon specified trigger events, such as contractual breach, deadlock, or shareholder default, thereby facilitating exit or changes in control.
Third-party determination: An independent expert or arbitrator resolves the dispute.
Cooling-off or status quo provisions: The business continues under previously agreed terms pending resolution.
Exit or liquidation: As a last resort, parties may agree to sell the company or wind it up.
Limitation: It is often costly and time-consuming.
Each mechanism carries different commercial implications, particularly in balancing majority control and minority protection, especially in companies involving foreign investors and local partners. The appropriate mechanism will depend on the nature of the business and the relationship between the parties. Without proper planning, even well-intentioned business arrangements may encounter difficulties in the long run.
Beyond Resolution: Contractual Control and Minority Protection
In addition to incorporating the deadlock resolution mechanisms, investors often rely on contractual governance tools to protect their position, including:
Reserved matters in the shareholders’ agreement, which may require approval from both majority and minority shareholders, effectively granting veto rights over key decisions such as issuance of shares, changes to business objectives, incurrence of significant debt, or disposal of material assets
Board control, quorum requirements and board composition, typically set out in the articles of association (AOA). For instance, it may be contractually agreed that a particular director appointed by a minority shareholder or a foreign investor must be present in order to constitute a valid board meeting. In terms of the Thai statutory minimum, shareholder meetings require at least two shareholders or proxies representing in aggregate not less than 25% of the company’s total share capital to constitute a quorum under Section 1178 of the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC)
Operational control arrangements, such as IP licensing, management agreements or technical services agreements, providing leverage over how the company is operated
With veto rights, board influence, operational control and exit leverage, potential conflicts can be managed through contractual clauses, preventing any party from being absolutely dominant. Notably, a minority shareholder may still exercise significant influence through contractual leverage rather than through equity ownership alone.
Regulatory Considerations
At the same time, not all control mechanisms are enforceable in every context. In foreign-invested structures, certain arrangements may be challenged if they are viewed as circumventing statutory ownership restrictions or sector-specific regulations.
When Deadlock Cannot Be Resolved
In some cases, contractual mechanisms and governance structures may not be sufficient to restore alignment. Where disagreements become entrenched, parties may ultimately need to consider structural solutions, including exit, liquidation, or corporate restructuring. One structural solution is amalgamation. The amended CCC has expanded the concept of amalgamation under Section 1238. Under this framework, one company may retain its juristic person status while absorbing another amalgamating entity. In such cases, rights and liabilities may transfer between entities, and inconsistencies between constitutional documents may need to be resolved through shareholder approval and proper registration procedures. Section 1238, 1240/1, 1240/2, 1242 and 1243 of the CCC form part of the statutory framework governing amalgamation, covering shareholder approval requirements and the legal consequences of combining entities.
Hidden Risks: Deadlock and Liability Transfer
Section 1243 addresses the legal consequences of amalgamation, including the transfer of rights, obligations, and liabilities from one entity to another. From a deadlock perspective, such restructuring represents a reset of ownership and control, but it does not necessarily eliminate underlying risks. Accordingly, issues arising during periods of deadlock, such as disputed transactions, governance failures, or improperly authorized decisions, may persist beyond the original company. From a transactional perspective, this highlights the importance of thorough legal due diligence. Where diligence is insufficient, the surviving entity may inadvertently assume liabilities rooted in unresolved shareholder disputes. In this sense, amalgamation does not resolve deadlock. It may simply relocate its consequences.
Final Thoughts
Deadlock is not merely a legal technicality. It is a strategic risk, particularly in joint ventures and closely held companies. Well-drafted agreements do not simply anticipate disagreement; they determine who holds power when agreement breaks down. Careful structuring of governance and dispute resolution mechanisms at an early stage is essential to ensure that disagreements do not escalate into operational disruption.
Disclaimer & Contact
This article is provided for general information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While I strive to keep my legal analysis accurate and practical, changes in law or other circumstances may affect its application. Readers should not act upon this information without seeking specific legal advice tailored to their circumstances. If you require advice on corporate structuring, shareholders’ agreements, or deadlock resolution mechanisms under Thai law, you are welcome to contact me to arrange an initial discussion.
📩 Contact: osa.chaichit@gmail.com
Osaris Chaichit
Attorney-at-Law (Thailand) | M&A and Corporate Transactions
Notarial Services Attorney

